Saturday, April 30, 2011

Atomic Energy Regulatory Board not so Subatomic




Tue, Apr 19, 2011 | Updated 08.09AM IST
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board not quite subatomic

By K S Parthasarathy

Recently, the independence of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) and its effectiveness attracted legitimate media scrutiny. Is AERB empowered to act?

The central government set up AERB in November 1983 and empowered it to enforce sections 16, 17 and 23 of the Atomic Energy Act , 1962. These cover control of radioactive substances, administration of the Factories Act, 1948 in the installations of the department of atomic energy (DAE) and enforcement of special provisions of safety. AERB enforces safety-related rules under the Atomic Energy Act.

There is a general perception that AERB is subservient to the department of atomic energy. A review of AERB's functioning does not support this view. Is AERB acting?

From AERB's annual reports, I counted over 50 regulatory actions such as reducing power levels of nuclear power reactors and shutting them down for specified periods to carry out appropriate tests and evaluations, among others which AERB imposed on DAE units.

Nuclear Power Corporation (NPCIL) may have felt that at times AERB has been a little too harsh. NPCIL implemented AERB directives without preferring appeals, even when it involved considerable expenditure.

During 1988 and 1989, AERB restricted the power levels of units 1 &2 of the Madras Atomic Power Station one after the other following failure of their inlet manifolds. It permitted NPCIL to restore power levels in 2003 and 2006, only after substantial upgradations and design changes.

Unit 1 of the Narora Atomic Power Station suffered a serious fire incident on March 31, 1993. AERB decided against the start-up of unit 2 of the Narora Atomic Power Station, pending complete investigation of the fire incident and implementation of the remedial measures recommended by two specialist committees set up by NPCIL and AERB,

The board ordered sequential shut down of each unit of the pressurised heavy water reactor (PHWR) stations for inspection of its turbine, generator and associated components to assess its state of health and fitness for continued operation and to modify the turbine roots. NPCIL complied with the directive.

In 1994, subsequent to the failure of the inner containment dome of unit 1 of the Kaiga Atomic Power Project, AERB suspended the civil construction activities related to the inner containment domes of Kagia unit 2, and units 3 and 4 of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Project. AERB lifted the hold only after satisfactory resolution of related safety matters.

In 2004, AERB prescribed 'formal and elaborate retraining and relicensing of all the frontline operating staff and the station management personnel' following a safety-related incident at the Kakrapar Atomic Power Station.

In 2007, the AERB withdrew the construction licence of units 5 and 6 of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Project when it found poor industrial safety status. It lifted the hold only after NPCIL ensured enhanced safety arrangements.

As directed by AERB, specialists re-evaluated the seismic safety of units 1 and 2 of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station which was designed as per the standards prevailing in 1969. NPCIL remedied the shortfalls by following international practices. NPCIL installed seismic sensors at all plants as stipulated by the AERB.

AERB imposed restrictions on many hospitals and other installations. AERB took action against the installations of the Oil & Natural Gas Commission, when it found lapses.

The list of AERB actions is indicative and not exhaustive. AERB enjoys functional autonomy; it takes its own decisions on merit. I was a witness to or participated in AERB activities closely since 1984. I do not recall a single instance in which DAE or others influenced AERB.

The five-member board has more members from outside the AEC family, it reports directly to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and not to an individual. AEC has the status of the government of India.

AERB has many specialists from outside the DAE in its committees. However, a robust regulatory system cannot rely on good intentions alone. AERB must be made a statutory organisation.

Recently, the Prime Minister stated that AERB's legal status will be enhanced. Some critics feel that ARRB "merely serves as a lapdog of the Department of Atomic Energy". Though the statement makes good copy, many regulatory actions of AERB from 1983 do not support the criticism. They show that a lapdog may just bark, but AERB actually bites.

I hope that AERB will continue to function effectively as it always did regardless of the perceived infirmities of its legal status.

(The author is a former secretary of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, government of India)


The Economic Times

Tue, Apr 19, 2011 | Updated 08.09AM IST

Atomic Energy Regulatory Board not quite subatomic

By K S Parthasarathy

Recently, the independence of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) and its effectiveness attracted legitimate media scrutiny. Is AERB empowered to act?

The central government set up AERB in November 1983 and empowered it to enforce sections 16, 17 and 23 of the Atomic Energy Act , 1962. These cover control of radioactive substances, administration of the Factories Act, 1948 in the installations of the department of atomic energy (DAE) and enforcement of special provisions of safety. AERB enforces safety-related rules under the Atomic Energy Act.

There is a general perception that AERB is subservient to the department of atomic energy. A review of AERB's functioning does not support this view. Is AERB acting?

From AERB's annual reports, I counted over 50 regulatory actions such as reducing power levels of nuclear power reactors and shutting them down for specified periods to carry out appropriate tests and evaluations, among others which AERB imposed on DAE units.

Nuclear Power Corporation (NPCIL) may have felt that at times AERB has been a little too harsh. NPCIL implemented AERB directives without preferring appeals, even when it involved considerable expenditure.

During 1988 and 1989, AERB restricted the power levels of units 1 &2 of the Madras Atomic Power Station one after the other following failure of their inlet manifolds. It permitted NPCIL to restore power levels in 2003 and 2006, only after substantial upgradations and design changes.

Unit 1 of the Narora Atomic Power Station suffered a serious fire incident on March 31, 1993. AERB decided against the start-up of unit 2 of the Narora Atomic Power Station, pending complete investigation of the fire incident and implementation of the remedial measures recommended by two specialist committees set up by NPCIL and AERB,

The board ordered sequential shut down of each unit of the pressurised heavy water reactor (PHWR) stations for inspection of its turbine, generator and associated components to assess its state of health and fitness for continued operation and to modify the turbine roots. NPCIL complied with the directive.

In 1994, subsequent to the failure of the inner containment dome of unit 1 of the Kaiga Atomic Power Project, AERB suspended the civil construction activities related to the inner containment domes of Kagia unit 2, and units 3 and 4 of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Project. AERB lifted the hold only after satisfactory resolution of related safety matters.

In 2004, AERB prescribed 'formal and elaborate retraining and relicensing of all the frontline operating staff and the station management personnel' following a safety-related incident at the Kakrapar Atomic Power Station.

In 2007, the AERB withdrew the construction licence of units 5 and 6 of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Project when it found poor industrial safety status. It lifted the hold only after NPCIL ensured enhanced safety arrangements.

As directed by AERB, specialists re-evaluated the seismic safety of units 1 and 2 of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station which was designed as per the standards prevailing in 1969. NPCIL remedied the shortfalls by following international practices. NPCIL installed seismic sensors at all plants as stipulated by the AERB.

AERB imposed restrictions on many hospitals and other installations. AERB took action against the installations of the Oil & Natural Gas Commission, when it found lapses.

The list of AERB actions is indicative and not exhaustive. AERB enjoys functional autonomy; it takes its own decisions on merit. I was a witness to or participated in AERB activities closely since 1984. I do not recall a single instance in which DAE or others influenced AERB.

The five-member board has more members from outside the AEC family, it reports directly to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and not to an individual. AEC has the status of the government of India.

AERB has many specialists from outside the DAE in its committees. However, a robust regulatory system cannot rely on good intentions alone. AERB must be made a statutory organisation.

Recently, the Prime Minister stated that AERB's legal status will be enhanced. Some critics feel that ARRB "merely serves as a lapdog of the Department of Atomic Energy". Though the statement makes good copy, many regulatory actions of AERB from 1983 do not support the criticism. They show that a lapdog may just bark, but AERB actually bites.

I hope that AERB will continue to function effectively as it always did regardless of the perceived infirmities of its legal status.

(The author is a former secretary of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, government of India)

Wednesday, March 23, 2011

Safe radiation dose


What is a safe radiation dose? The best answer is “It depends”. Though some puritans may argue that there is no safe dose!

There is no universally acceptable safe dose. For radiation workers, Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) wants the annual dose to be “as low as reasonably achievable” (ALARA); also it should not exceed 30 millisievert (mSv) excluding the dose due to natural background radiation and medical exposure, if any. AERB dose limit at 30mSv is lower than 50 mSv prescribed by USA (Sv is a unit of biologically effective dose. One Sv corresponds to a radiation energy absorption of one joule per kg; millisievert is one thousandth of a Sv). I have received about 0.9mSv while recovering a lost radiation source used in industry.

During the Fukushima accident one worker received 106mSv. Dose to recovery workers are not published so far.

For members of the public, the dose limit is one mSv. Pregnant workers may continue to work but the dose to the foetus should not exceed one mSv. In medically justified procedures the following doses in mSv may be considered as safe. Cardiac CT scan 12; angioplasty (a life-saving procedure involving removal of blocks in blood vessels)on an average 400; at times even 1000mSv; treatment of hyperthyroidism, 100,000; radiation treatment of cancer 60,000 mSv to part of the body. In all cases doses must be ALARA without losing medical benefits.

 In USA, the dose limit for an astronaut is 250mSv per mission. In an off-site radiation emergency, sheltering and administration of stable iodine may start at a minimum dose of 20 mSv; evacuation is mandated at 100mSv.

The average natural background radiation dose is 2.4mSv annually. In England & Wales, residents of over 100,000 to 200,000 homes are exposed to more than 10mSv annually from radon, a radioactive gas found in nature. The maximum value is more than 100mSv. Millions of persons in countries with temperate weather receive doses ranging from 5 to10 mSv from radon decay products

Thus, we accept different values of doses as safe and acceptable, depending on circumstances. One need not lose sleep over receiving a few tens of mSv, if the occasion demands it.